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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS BY ANOTHER NAME: 





In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,1 a 5-
4 majority of the United States Supreme Court reversed a state court 
decision that had limited the application of Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission2 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.3  Nollan and Do-
lan concern the imposition of regulatory conditions on proposed de-
velopment, also called exactions, which commonly occurs in land use 
regulation.  In Koontz, a property owner challenged a regulatory 
agency’s denial of his permit application following failed negotia-
tions over exactions.4  The Florida Supreme Court had concluded that 
Nollan and Dolan did not extend to conditions that the agency had 
not officially approved and applied to the owner’s property, nor did 
they extend to conditions that imposed fees on property owners.5  The 
United States Supreme Court reversed both conclusions, holding that 
Nollan and Dolan’s heightened scrutiny, which reviews exactions for 
their “rough proportionality”6 and “nexus”7 to the proposed develop-
ment, can apply in both contexts.8 
Unsurprisingly, in a public law doctrine as contested as regu-
latory takings, the initial responses to the decision, on blogs and in 
one early article, are fairly predictable—those sympathetic with gov-
ernment defendants or critical of the Court’s occasional efforts to ex-
 
 Levin College of Law, University of Florida. 
1 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
2 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
3 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
4 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592-93. 
5 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
6 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
7 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
8 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591. 
1
Fenster: Substantive Due Process by Another Name
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
404 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
pand federal constitutional property rights disdain it,9 while those 
committed to robust constitutional property rights have embraced it.10  
I suggest in this brief essay that we might best understand Koontz not 
as signaling a new direction in regulatory takings law, but as solidify-
ing the Court’s exactions jurisprudence as one of its curious carve-
outs from the Penn Central test11—the deferential test that the Court 
firmly ensconced as the default approach to regulatory takings claims 
in the most recent chapter of the doctrine’s last half-century.12  
Koontz, I argue, completes the move that the Court’s 2005 decision in 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.13 began, rendering the exactions deci-
sions in Nollan, Dolan, and now Koontz, as conceptually and practi-
cally outside of the federal constitutional takings realm entirely, and 
existing in the astral realm, known as unconstitutional conditions.  
There, the exactions tests for nexus and proportionality can float free 
from the textual and remedial constraints that the Fifth Amendment, 
at least nominally, imposes on the regulatory takings doctrine.  From 
that distant point, Nollan and Dolan should have little effect on the 
core regulatory takings tests—but they will, now, after Koontz, cause 
some considerable challenges for state and lower federal courts, es-
pecially when they must fashion a remedy besides the just compensa-
tion that the Fifth Amendment requires for a taking.  In a brief final 
conclusion, I suggest that we cannot know the effects that Koontz will 
have on land use regulation, although we can expect that they will 
vary across jurisdictions and, like Nollan and Dolan, will, in some in-
stances lead to more regulation and in others, lead to less. 
 
9  See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22.1 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.  (forthcoming 2014);  Rick Hills, Koontz’s Unintelligible Takings Rule: 
Can Remedial Equivocation save the Court from a Doctrinal Quagmire?, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(June 25, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/koontzs-
unintelligible-takings-rule-can-remedial-equivocation-make-up-for-an-incoherent-
substantive-.html. 
10 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional 
Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 215, 228 (2012-2013); Richard Epstein, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District: Of Issues Resolved–and Shoved under the Table, POINTOFLAW.COM (June 26, 2013, 
1:07 PM), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2013/06/koontz-v-st-johns-river-water-
management-district-of-issues-resolved--and-shoved-under-the-table.php. 
11 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (establish-
ing ad hoc balancing test for regulatory takings doctrine). 
12 See generally Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The In-
stitutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Regulat-
ing Land Use] (discussing the Takings Doctrine). 
13 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
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I. KOONTZ’S ANTI-COERCION PRINCIPLE 
To boil the facts in Koontz down to their essence, the petition-
er (“Koontz”) approached the government agency (St. Johns Water 
Management District, or “District”) that regulates water resources in 
the region where Koontz’s property was located to obtain a permit 
that was necessary for him to develop his property.14  The District, 
with permitting authority delegated to it by the state, discussed with 
Koontz various potential mitigation schemes for the expected effects 
of his development.15  Koontz did not agree with the District’s pro-
posals and made proposals of his own, which the District rejected.16  
Lacking any acceptable mitigation, Koontz’s permit application was 
denied by the District.
17
  He filed suit alleging, among other things, 
that the denial effected a taking of his property for which he was 
owed compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.18  
A majority of the Florida Supreme Court, unanimously reversing 
lower state courts, held that Koontz’s claim could not benefit from 
the heightened scrutiny afforded by Nollan and Dolan, with the ma-
jority concluding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply both because no 
mitigation measures were imposed and because the mitigation 
measures were fees rather than land.19 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.20  The five-justice majori-
ty’s main concern was with what it characterized as the coercive na-
ture of the land use regulatory process to which the property owner 
had been subjected.21  The decision’s opening paragraph made plain 
its distaste for the kind of discretionary authority that the District 
wielded, characterizing Nollan and Dolan in its first sentence as 
providing “important protection against the misuse of the power of 
land-use regulation” and then describing, in its brief summary of the 
case, the District’s condition as a requirement to “surrender” a prop-
erty interest and the property owner’s response as a “refus[al] to 
yield.”22  Property owners, the Court explained, are always potential-
 
14 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592. 
15 Id. at 2593. 
16 Id. at 2592-93. 
17 Id. at 2593. 
18 Id. at 2591, 2593. 
19 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593-94. 
20 Id. at 2594. 
21 Id. at 2594-95. 
22 Id. at 2591. 
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ly at risk of coercion in the land use permitting process: 
[T]he government often has broad discretion to deny a 
permit that is worth far more than property it would 
like to take.  By conditioning a building permit on the 
owner’s deeding over a public right-of-way, for exam-
ple, the government can pressure an owner into volun-
tarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amend-
ment would otherwise require just compensation. . . .  
Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth 
Amendment right to just compensation, and the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.23 
More than even its strong statement in Lingle, situating Nol-
lan and Dolan as takings decisions with a foot also in the unconstitu-
tional takings doctrine,24 the Court in Koontz appeared, at first glance, 
to situate the constitutional review of land use conditions only partial-
ly in the Takings Clause.25  The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
the Court noted, vindicates disparate individual rights, including the 
right to free speech under the First Amendment, as well as the consti-
tutional right to travel.26  The doctrine’s application to the Takings 
Clause is “special,” however, because the conditions may be permis-
sible without liability for a taking if they mitigate the costs created by 
the approved land uses to which the conditions are attached.27  
Though its application may be “special,” the doctrine must operate in 
this context because of the government’s coercive power to impose 
excessive demands that bear little relationship, in quantity and quali-
ty, to the proposed land use.28  Hence, Nollan and Dolan established 
the “rough proportionality” (quantitative) and “nexus” (qualitative) 
tests to protect against the state’s unequal bargaining power to en-
force constitutional limits on conditions that are insufficiently related 
and are, therefore, likely to be coercive.29 
 
23 Id. at 2594-95. 
24 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547 (delineating the explicit linkage between the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine and the exactions decision begun in Dolan); see also Dolan, 512 
U.S. at 385 (discussing this relationship). 
25 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95. 
26 Id. at 2594 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Memorial Hospital v. 
Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974)).  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) 
(stating that the right to travel has no clear textual source in the Constitution). 
27 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95. 
28 Id. at 2594. 
29 Id. at 2594-95. 
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Having explained the doctrine’s singular focus on checking 
government coercion, the Court held that there was no material dis-
tinction between the factual differences at play in the regulatory con-
ditions in Koontz—threatened conditions rather than imposed condi-
tions, and money exactions, rather than real property dedications—
and those in Nollan and Dolan, which addressed regulatory approvals 
with attached conditions that required dedications of real property in-
terests.30  The Court could deploy the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine’s trans-substantive status as “an overarching principle” in 
order to “vindicate[] the Constitution’s enumerated rights by prevent-
ing the government from coercing people into giving them up.”31  
Coercion is coercion, no matter if the state has yet to impose any 
formal conditions as part of its issuance of an official approval, and 
no matter if the as-yet imposed condition is an interest in real proper-
ty or the money from a fee tied to an interest in real property.32  Tak-
ing a legal realist perspective on what it viewed as meaningless for-
mal distinctions, the Court pierced the veil of this class of 
government actions to find the coercive character lurking within.33 
The Court faced three significant issues in applying Nollan 
and Dolan to the facts in Koontz, each of which arises from the chal-
lenge of applying the Takings Clause to land use exactions.  The un-
constitutional conditions doctrine’s freestanding status allowed the 
Court to overcome each issue, at least to its satisfaction if not to the 
dissent’s.34  The first issue was the District’s credible argument that 
monetary fees are somehow different from real property exactions 
and are not, therefore, “property” cognizable under the Takings 
Clause.35  In response, the Koontz majority answered that money ex-
actions can be property because the conditional fees that the District 
allegedly sought to impose were tied to Koontz’s application to de-
velop his property.36  Under this logic, fees fall squarely within the 
otherwise confusing precedent regarding the taking of money.37  
Equally significant, however, the Court noted that the unconstitution-
 
30 Id. at 2590, 2595-96. 
31 Id. at 2594. 
32 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595-96. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 2594. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 2599. 
37 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600. 
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al conditions doctrine could not allow a government entity to enjoy a 
lower level of scrutiny for its exactions simply by shifting its de-
mands from real property to money.38  To allow the government to do 
so would simply enable it to abuse its regulatory authority—precisely 
the wrongdoing that the doctrine is intended to prevent.39 
The second and third issues were related.  The second was the 
absence of an actual taking in Koontz, since, as all nine justices 
agreed, the District took no constitutionally cognizable property.40  
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine allowed the majority to hold 
that Koontz need not have shown the actual loss of property to state a 
Nollan and Dolan claim: 
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use 
permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not 
because they take property but because they imper-
missibly burden the right not to have property taken 
without just compensation.  As in other unconstitu-
tional conditions cases in which someone refuses to 
cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive pres-
sure, the impermissible denial of a governmental bene-
fit is a constitutionally cognizable injury.41 
The demand for property, combined with the denial of a permit rather 
than an actual taking, constituted an injury because the District alleg-
edly based its decision on Koontz’s refusal to accede to an illegally 
coercive demand.42 
Third, the Court faced the argument that a regulatory act in 
which no property is taken cannot serve as the basis for a takings 
claim because the Takings Clause’s sole and required remedy for a 
violation, just compensation, could not apply.43  Reframing the issue, 
the Court stated that a remedy for a violation of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, rather than for a violation of the Takings Clause, 
would be available under state law, and remanded the case to the 
 
38 Id. at 2599. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 2597 (characterizing Koontz as a case of “an excessive demand but no taking”); 
id. at 2612 (“In what legal universe could a law authorizing damages only for a ‘taking’ also 
provide damages when (as all agree) no taking has occurred?”) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
41 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596. 
42 Id. at 2593, 2596. 
43 Id. at 2611-12 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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Florida Supreme Court to consider the appropriate remedy.44  The 
Takings Clause thus served neither as the legal basis for Koontz’s 
claim, nor did it provide the remedy. 
In responding to all three counter-arguments, the Court ex-
plained that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its broad an-
ti-coercion principle could at once resolve and even transcend any 
formalist concerns about takings doctrine and the Fifth Amendment’s 
text.45  Justice Alito’s decision in Koontz thus made two basic moves.  
First, it identified and described a class of regulatory acts that are 
symptomatic of programmatic unfairness in the land use regulatory 
process that, as such, hold the potential for extortionate government 
overreach.46  It then deployed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
which is tied loosely to the Takings Clause and embodied in the prec-
edent of Nollan and Dolan.  The heightened scrutiny of those deci-
sions established the prophylactic protection necessary to prevent 
such programmatic unfairness.47 
Justice Kagan’s four-justice opinion dissented on both issues, 
arguing that Koontz failed to state a cognizable claim under Nollan 
and Dolan and that the intermediate scrutiny established in those de-
cisions did not apply to money exactions.48  Some commentators 
have incorrectly asserted that her dissent agreed entirely with the ma-
jority’s decision that Nollan and Dolan apply in the absence of for-
mal conditions.49  Justice Kagan agreed that heightened scrutiny 
could apply to a singular demand the government makes, whether the 
permit is approved (in a condition subsequent) or not (and therefore 
constitutes a condition precedent).50  But she quite clearly stated that 
Nollan and Dolan can only apply when a court finds that “the permit 
denial occurred because the government made a demand of the land-
owner, which he rebuffed,” and that the demand be “unequivocal.”51  
The record did not support Koontz’s claim in this regard, the dissent 
concluded52—a problem that property owners will frequently face in 
Koontz-like cases, because in most such cases they will only have a 
 
44 Id. at 2597-98. 
45 Id. at 2594. 
46 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95. 
47 Id. at 2595. 
48 Id. at 2603-04 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
49 See Somin, supra note 10, at 227-28; Epstein, supra note 10, at 2. 
50 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603-04 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 2610. 
52 Id. at 2611. 
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claim based on informal discussions and negotiations rather than a 
clear, final, formal statement.  Requiring a clear, formal demand is 
necessary for a Nollan and Dolan claim, Justice Kagan warned, or 
else the threat of heightened scrutiny will subsume all discussions be-
tween owners and regulatory agencies.53  Moreover, a court will have 
no basis for deciding whether and what property had been taken—a 
problem that Koontz itself illustrates, as the District had proposed 
numerous possible conditions, no one of which clearly emerged in 
the record as the single condition rejected by the property owner 
which led the government to deny his permit application.54  Although 
the dissent agreed with the majority in theory, then, the strict limits 
Justice Kagan would place on that theory’s application reveal the four 
dissenting justices’ deep misgivings about inviting courts into the 
weeds of the regulatory process.55 
The dissent’s concerns also extended to the money exactions 
issue.  Under existing precedent, Justice Kagan argued, fees that im-
pose a general liability were not property whose taking the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits without compensation.56  Placing limits on the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine when tied to the Takings Clause, 
the dissent stated: 
[T]he heightened standard of Nollan and Dolan is not 
a freestanding protection for land-use permit appli-
cants; rather, it is “a special application of the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions, which provides that the 
government may not require a person to give up a con-
stitutional right—here the right to receive just com-
pensation when property is taken”—in exchange for a 
land-use permit.  As such, Nollan and Dolan apply on-
ly if the demand at issue would have violated the Con-
stitution independent of that proposed exchange.  Or 
put otherwise, those cases apply only if the demand 
would have constituted a taking when executed out-
 
53 Id. at 2610. 
54 Id. at 2609-10.  The Koontz dissent’s concern is consistent with an issue that Justice 
Scalia had raised a decade earlier in a dissent from a denial of certiorari in a similar case, 
when he questioned whether a taking actually occurs in the absence of an identifiable, formal 
condition.  See Lambert v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 529 U.S. 1045, 1048 (2000) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
55 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
56 Id. at 2605-07. 
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side the permitting process.57 
If money is not property that is cognizable under the Takings Clause, 
the dissent reasoned, then Nollan and Dolan cannot apply.58 
The Koontz dissent thus also made two moves.  First, it re-
fused both to characterize the case as one in which the government 
imposed an extortionate demand and to view the land use regulatory 
process as one marked by widespread coercion.59  Second, it would 
have limited the applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine under the Takings Clause to instances in which the state had re-
quired a definite condition that resulted in the taking of an identifia-
ble real property interest.60  Put simply, whereas the majority viewed 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a trans-substantive means 
to fight the coercive negotiations that are endemic to the area of land 
use regulation, the dissent viewed the doctrine as subject to textual 
and precedential constraints under the Takings Clause and would 
have drawn a much smaller category of formal negotiations that are 
subject to Nollan and Dolan.  I consider the meaning and significance 
of the majority and dissent’s competing visions of exactions and the 
most appropriate doctrinal approaches to them in the next part. 
II. KOONTZ, REGULATORY TAKINGS, AND THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE: OR, 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS BY ANOTHER NAME 
Capturing a fifth justice, the majority’s understanding of the 
case and of the class of regulatory actions prevailed, as did its appar-
ent vision of the relationship between Nollan and Dolan (and now 
Koontz) and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  For commenta-
tors sympathetic to the Koontz decision it marks a welcome return of 
vigorous property rights enforcement in a contested takings case, and 
especially applauded is the Court’s explicit acknowledgement of the 
need to check government efforts at imposing extortionate demands 
on vulnerable property owners.61  The Court’s factual narrative and 
 
57 Id. at 2606-07 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547). 
58 Id. at 2606. 
59 Id. at 2608, 2611. 
60 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2609 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
61 See Somin, supra note 10, at 241.  See also Epstein, supra note 10 (characterizing 
Koontz as a “victory of sorts” for property owners because it provides the “second best” pro-
tection to property owners who are “held up” by the government). 
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justification for its decision sound in the classic rights-friendly ver-
sion of the regulatory takings doctrine—one that views the doctrine 
as an essential constitutional means to provide strong protection for 
individuals from the state’s use of its police power to take their prop-
erty in actions that go “too far” (in Justice Holmes’s famous, cryptic 
phrase),62 and that “forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole” (as the Armstrong principle declares).63 
But this explanation of the Takings Clause is just one among 
numerous competing ones that the Court and commentators have de-
veloped, and the Court has not been consistent in its reliance on 
them.64  The dissent’s concern that Koontz “threatens the heartland of 
local land-use regulation and service delivery” and the multitude of 
varied state and local approaches to land use regulation65 represents 
what I have argued is the most important and oft-cited justification 
for denying regulatory takings claims, and one that had found signifi-
cant purchase in takings decisions over the past decade—the relative 
institutional competence of legislative, regulatory, and judicial enti-
ties, especially at the state and local level, to decide land use issues.66  
 
62 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
63 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  See generally Mark Fenster, The 
Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property Rights, 9 U. 
PA. J. CON. L. 667, 694-706 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Legal Process] (describing the fair-
ness rationale as the most significant and oft-cited justification for constitutional property 
rights protection). 
64 Another such rationale is the utilitarian concern with the consequences of excessive or 
inadequate regulation.  Academic property rights advocates have argued that Koontz will not 
only protect property owners but that it will promote more efficient regulation by forcing 
government entities to internalize the costs they would otherwise shift to property owners 
through compensation, see Somin, supra note 10, at 234, and by moving the law incremen-
tally towards having the benefits that the government seeks through a condition match more 
precisely the harms that an approved land use creates.  See Epstein, supra note 10.  Such 
consequential conceptions of the Takings Clause as a mechanism for regulatory efficiency 
are another set of justifications that the Court and commentators have frequently relied upon 
in explaining the Takings Clause.  See Fenster, Legal Process, supra note 63, at 706-10.  But 
as in most takings decisions, see id. at 710-12, the majority in Koontz did not consider such 
concerns; instead, its only discussion of cost internalization occurred when it explained that 
Nollan and Dolan allow the government to impose conditions without compensating proper-
ty owners in order to keep property owners from externalizing harms on others.  Koontz, 133 
S. Ct. at 2595 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
65 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608-10 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
66 See Fenster, Legal Process, supra note 63, at 733-39 (articulating this critique on 
Koontz).  See also Rick Hills, Bill Fischel on Koontz: Why Federalism should limit enforce-
ment of Takings Doctrine, PRAWFSBLAWG, (Aug. 16, 2013, 12:50 PM) 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/08/bill-fischel-on-koontz-why-federalism-
10
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Lingle doubted the wisdom of allowing open-ended federal constitu-
tional standards to decide the takings issue in the absence of the regu-
lations that are “functionally equivalent” to confiscation.67  By draw-
ing tight limits around the regulatory takings doctrines and especially 
around those categories of regulatory effects that receive more than 
deferential scrutiny, Lingle appeared to place institutional compe-
tence and deference to political and state and local institutions over 
the federal constitutional protection of property owners from all but 
the worst regulatory unfairness.68 
Read superficially with an emphasis on its result, Koontz 
would appear to have signaled the reemergence in contested regulato-
ry takings decisions of fairness, rather than institutional competence, 
as the Takings Clause’s preeminent function and justification—at 
least by the margin of one justice.  But did it?  In a blog post that ap-
peared soon after Koontz was issued, Richard Epstein, the preeminent 
academic property rights advocate and longtime bête noir of those 
who seek to narrow the reach of the Takings Clause, lamented that 
the decision provided little more than a second best solution to the 
state’s systematic overreach in its regulatory actions beyond the lim-
its of common law nuisance.69  Epstein had hoped for a “robust cri-
tique of all exactions”; instead, the Court issued a narrow decision 
with some beneficial components (from his perspective) that failed to 
provide a coherent or even adequate remedy.70  Whereas Ilya Somin, 
a libertarian of a younger generation writing in the Cato Institute re-
view of the Supreme Court term, considered the decision a step in the 
 
should-limit-enforcement-of-takings-doctrine.html (quoting an email from William Fischel); 
Hills, supra note 9 (critiquing the decision in federalist terms, as an invasion “of subnational 
governments’ land-use prerogatives” and a violation of important federalist principles).  As I 
have argued, federalism constitutes a justification for regulatory takings decisions, particu-
larly when viewed as a check on the Court’s tendency to expand federal constitutional prop-
erty rights to supersede state property law, see Fenster, Legal Process, supra note 63, at 719-
22, but it is rarely a core justification upon which the Court relies, see id. at 722-26; Carol 
M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1681, 
1693-1701 (2007), perhaps in part because those justices who more prominently claim to 
uphold federalist values prioritize property rights over the rights of subnational governments 
to regulate under the police power.  See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 726-27 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (showing no 
hesitation in asserting that federal courts can and may impose takings liability for a state 
court’s interpretation of its own property law); but see Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Di-
mension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203 (2004). 
67 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
68 Id. at 539-40. 
69 See Epstein, supra note 10. 
70 Id. 
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right direction,71 Epstein yearned for “coherence”—which is to say a 
thoroughgoing, muscular approach to property rights protection that 
would sweep away the existing approach to the Takings Clause and 
make strict judicial scrutiny the rule rather than the exception in chal-
lenges to land use and environmental regulation.72 
Epstein is right to be disappointed, and one would not need to 
look any further than the Court’s incoherent and faint-hearted remedy 
to see the decision’s incrementalism.  The Fifth Amendment pre-
scribes a remedy for a taking—just compensation—that the Court 
could find no way to impose on the District because, it conceded, no 
property had in fact been taken from Koontz for which compensation 
could be awarded.73  Dodging this textual challenge and seeking to 
establish a remedy outside the constitutional text, the Court held that 
under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a property owner like 
Koontz can seek a remedy in state law rather than under the federal 
constitution.74  Remanding the case back to the lower courts, the 
Court suggested that because Koontz brought his takings claim under 
state law, he could rely on the state courts to find a remedy under 
Florida law, such as a statute allowing the award of damages for a 
state agency action that is “an unreasonable exercise of the state’s po-
lice power constituting a taking without just compensation.”75  But 
the Court provided neither an answer as to whether this or any other 
state law could provide a remedy, nor any guidance for future liti-
gants and lower courts as to how to apply such remedies in particular 
cases.  Instead, it simply remanded the case for the lower courts to 
decide on a remedy.  This was, as Epstein noted, neither robust nor 
coherent.76 
The Court’s nebulous remedy not only blunts Koontz’s result, 
but also unveils the emergence of a somewhat new vision for the con-
stitutional rules regarding exactions.  The relationship between the 
Court’s exactions decisions and the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine had begun as an implicit logic in Nollan77 and in Dolan, with the 
 
71 See Somin, supra note 10, at 243. 
72 See Epstein, supra note 10. 
73 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (“While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes 
that this burdens a constitutional right, the Fifth Amendment mandates a particular remedy—
just compensation—only for takings.”). 
74 Id. at 2595. 
75 Id. at 2597-98 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.617). 
76 See Epstein, supra note 10. 
77 Nollan did not mention the unconstitutional conditions doctrine explicitly, but several 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 2, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/11
2014] SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS BY ANOTHER NAME 415 
latter, unlike the former, at least providing a brief mention of the doc-
trine and a string citation to its canonical decisions.78  It was not until 
Lingle, when the Court was forced to extricate Nollan and Dolan 
from the shadow of substantive due process and the “substantially 
advance legitimate state interests” language from Agins v. City of Ti-
buron,79 that the Court revealed that its exactions decisions were in 
fact, a “special application” of the unconstitutional doctrine.80  Be-
cause the property owners in Nollan and Dolan suffered the loss of an 
interest in an identifiable piece of property, the Court could appropri-
ately invoke just compensation as a remedy.81 
Tellingly, when discussing its remand to the Florida Supreme 
Court to consider the appropriate state law remedy, the Koontz major-
ity stated: “Whether that provision covers an unconstitutional condi-
tions claim like the one at issue here is a question of state law that the 
Florida Supreme Court did not address and on which we will not 
opine.”82  Justice Alito’s characterization of Koontz’s claim revealed 
the logic of the majority’s decision.  Because Koontz concerned the 
application of Nollan and Dolan, one must similarly conclude that 
those decisions are now not takings decisions either.  The entire field 
of exactions now, apparently, falls under the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine rather than the Takings Clause. 
State and lower federal courts could read this decision as thus 
widening the scope of judicial remedies to include invalidation or 
other measures not available under the Fifth Amendment.83  Recall 
the statute to which Justice Alito would refer the Florida Supreme 
Court—one that offers a remedy to “an unreasonable exercise of the 
state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensa-
 
commentators viewed it as an implicit authority on which the decision relied.  See Vicki 
Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Con-
ditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 473-75 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1463-64 (1989). 
78 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
79 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
80 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547. 
81 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86, 389 (noting compensation as the appropriate rem-
edy); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842 (“[I]f [California] wants an easement across the Nollans' prop-
erty, it must pay for it.”). 
82 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597-98 (emphasis added). 
83 See id. at 2597 (“Because petitioner brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause of 
action, the Court has no occasion to discuss what remedies might be available for a Nol-
lan/Dolan unconstitutional conditions violation either here or in other cases.”). 
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tion.”84  That sounds, quite clearly, like the kind of substantive due 
process theory that the Court had banished from the Takings Clause 
in Lingle.  As a matter of remedy, Koontz might work a subtle but 
important shift into the judicial review of exactions.  Specifically, it 
creates an issue going forward regarding the remedy available for a 
Nollan and Dolan claim—can a claimant who challenges an approval 
with conditions, and not simply the threat of conditions, seek some-
thing other than or in addition to just compensation?  That is, can 
Koontz’s notable characterization of itself as an unconstitutional con-
ditions case shift the entire constitutional exactions doctrine wholly 
out of the traditional regulatory takings doctrine?  The decision cer-
tainly suggests as much. 
In terms of the larger picture of regulatory takings law, how-
ever, Koontz is likely to have little significance.  Despite the hope 
among property rights advocates that Dolan’s proportionality logic 
and heightened scrutiny would overtake Penn Central’s deferential 
multi-factor test,85 the exactions decisions have since operated as nar-
row carve-outs like the Lucas wipe-out rule86 and the Loretto perma-
nent occupation rule.87  Koontz only further solidifies a status that had 
long been recognized in the complex doctrinal mess that is the regu-
latory takings doctrine.  Only practitioners and judges—and, perhaps, 
seasoned land use professionals with the patience necessary to over-
come their struggle with the doctrine—need understand the subtle 
distinctions the Court’s categories make.  The regulatory takings doc-
trine’s technical complexity continues to grow in order to meet the 
challenge of providing occasional federal constitutional protection 
against the vast multitude of land use regulators and regulations.  It is 
a convoluted game that few can play but that affects, at least indirect-
ly, everyone.  The state of this game is not new, and Koontz has only 
added to it despite the decision’s facial appearance as a simple and 
fair intervention against coercive regulation on behalf of downtrod-
den landowners. 
Viewing this new wrinkle—that Nollan and Dolan are (now) 
really unconstitutional conditions cases—explains a few mysteries, 
and further illustrates how Koontz’s influence will be limited.  Justice 
 
84 Id. at 2597-98 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617 (2012)). 
85 See Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1011-12. (1997). 
86 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
87 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
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Kennedy has come to occupy Justice O’Connor’s former role as the 
swing vote in contested takings decisions.  He has also expressed re-
peatedly in separate opinions, most recently in the 2010 decision in 
Stop the Beach,88 that he has a particular interest in substituting the 
substantive due process doctrine for the regulatory takings doctrine in 
cases when the latter is not easily applied.89  Koontz fits that descrip-
tion—property owners facing exploitative government entities may 
not lose their property every time they are coerced by excessive con-
ditions, but they do face coercion.  The Fifth Amendment’s text does 
not easily address this situation, as the Court noted in Lingle,90 
demonstrating the need for a trans-substantive doctrine unburdened 
by the constitutional text that can provide relief against “arbitrary or 
irrational” regulation—like substantive due process.91  But, the 
Court’s conservative members either reject substantive due process in 
this context,92 or have drawn extremely tight limits around its appli-
cation.93  Perhaps for Justice Kennedy, the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine achieves what he believes substantive due process 
would achieve more broadly, while the doctrine offers a far more sat-
isfying solution than substantive due process to the problem of pro-
tecting property rights for the other justices. 
Viewed this way, Koontz can be little more than a footnote.  
Professor Epstein is right—the decision does not augur an imminent 
rollback of the regulatory state via a broad constitutional requirement 
for compensation.94 
III. CONCLUSION: ANTICIPATING KOONTZ’S EFFECTS WITHOUT 
PREDICTING THEM 
Will Koontz have influence at all in the quotidian world of 
land use and environmental regulation?  Making predictions about 
the effects of a new, complex Supreme Court decision on the com-
 
88 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 736-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
89 Id.; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
90 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544-45. 
91 Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
92 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 721-22 (Scalia, J., plurality opin-
ion) (rejecting the use of substantive due process doctrine and arguing against its expansion). 
93 See United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 401-02 
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding that substantive due process test in challenges to land use regulation 
is a “shocks-the-conscience” standard). 
94 Epstein, supra note 10. 
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plex and widely varied practices of state, regional, and local land use 
regulators is a fool’s errand.  Nollan and Dolan’s federal constitu-
tionalization of exactions only presaged the practice’s wide expan-
sion over the past few decades—in other words, the decisions corre-
lated with an expansion of the regulatory practice about which the 
Court expressed skepticism, and the expanded use of exactions no 
doubt also led to a greater absolute number of abusive conditions that 
landowners did not challenge.  The Court’s prophylactic rules thus 
perversely might have made things worse for some landowners.95  As 
a study published in 2000 of California planners found, land use 
regulators have had a mixed reaction to the proportionality and nexus 
requirements that Nollan and Dolan announced: planners respected 
the tests for expressing good planning principles, and thus presuma-
bly incorporated them into their practice, which itself expanded with 
the real estate boom of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centu-
ries; and planners feared the climate of enhanced judicial review that 
the Supreme Court seemed to have ushered in, and are cautious and 
more bureaucratic in their use of exactions.96  Nollan and Dolan thus 
had no single effect.  Regulatory agencies varied in the ways in 
which they incorporated or ignored them in practice.97 
This suggests that except around the margins, Koontz is not 
likely to cause any radical change to regulatory practice.  The hall-
marks of Nollan and Dolan—wide variability and a turn towards reg-
ulatory formulas and bureaucratic caution at the agency level,98 and 
increased state and local legislation to limit regulatory abuse99—will 
continue.  Indeed, in 2004, Florida by statute and regulation estab-
lished formal regulatory formulas for calculating, through quantita-
tive and qualitative scoring, wetland impact and mitigation, precisely 
the issue that the District sought to address informally in its dealings 
with Koontz.100  Other agencies will quite rationally stop or at least 
 
95 Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Conse-
quences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 661-65 (2004) [hereinafter Fenster, Takings For-
malism]. 
96 DANIEL POLLAK, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, HAVE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S 5TH 
AMENDMENT TAKINGS DECISIONS CHANGED LAND USE PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA? 33-34, 83 
(2000). 
97 Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 95, at 652-68. 
98 Id. at 642-48. 
99 Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 12, at 759-60. 
100 See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-345.100 (2013) (seeking to establish “a standardized 
procedure for assessing the functions provided by wetlands and other surface waters, the 
amount that those functions are reduced by a proposed impact, and the amount of mitigation 
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limit negotiations and informal conversations with property owners 
about possible mitigation measures; still others will increase the 
amount of bureaucratic red tape they impose before placing condi-
tions on development in order to establish, early in the approval pro-
cess, Nollan and Dolan compliance; and many will know that they 
can always simply deny a permit application and face lower constitu-
tional scrutiny than if they discuss conditioning its issuance with the 
property owner.101  Koontz’s practical effects, then, will not neces-
sarily help property owners—it may protect them in some places, but 
it likely will not in others—and will merely continue and expand the 
dynamics at work for decades.102 
Koontz’s subtle but real doctrinal effects, however, could au-
gur significant changes in the Court’s exactions doctrine and in litiga-
tion.  It is here, and especially in providing a remedy, that courts will 
have to reckon with the Court’s newly emerged understanding of 
Nollan and Dolan as unconstitutional conditions cases—which is to 
say, as a line of cases that rely more on the logic of substantive due 
process than on the text of the Takings Clause and the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine that the Court has established since deciding Penn Cen-
tral. 
 
necessary to offset that loss” in order to execute FLA. STAT. § 373.414(18) (2012)); see gen-
erally Memorandum from Jeff Littlejohn, Deputy Sec’y for Regulatory Programs, Fla. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot., on Interpreting and Applying the Unif. Mitigation Assessment Method (June 
15, 2011) (on file with the Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.), available at 
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/watman/files/007_umam_guidance_061511.pdf (provid-
ing general guidance for how regulators must “score” impact and mitigation under the Uni-
form Mitigation Assessment Method); Bonnie Malloy, Symbolic Gestures or Our Saving 
Grace: The Relevance of Compensatory Mitigation for Florida’s Wetlands in the Climate 
Change Era, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 103, 125-26 (2011) (describing history of UMAM 
and regulatory processes that follow it). 
101 See Echeverria, supra note 9, at 2. 
102 See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 95, at 653. 
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